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This is the report of the 8th Expert Hearing of the LSE Commission on the Future of 
Britain in Europe that took place at the LSE on the 22 March 2016. The LSE Commission 
was initiated in the autumn 2015 to inform the British referendum debate, and the 
Commission’s Expert Hearings have resulted in a series of debates and publications on a 
broad range of topics, including the consequences of Brexit for migration and refugee 
policy, the UK and EU economy and financial sector, and higher education.
This Hearing brought together leading scholars, pollsters, diplomats and politicians to 
discuss two crucial aspects of the democratic legitimacy of Britain’s relationship with the 
EU: the upcoming referendum on British membership and the role of national parliaments 
in EU decision-making. Participants were invited for their expertise on referendums, public 
opinion, and parliaments, and not for any particular views they may hold about Britain’s 
relationship to the EU.
We are extremely grateful for the insightful contributions by the participants during the 
hearing as well as for the written submissions by the experts that took part. This report is 
based on both the debate as well as the written material. None of the views or conclusions 
included in this report can be attributed to a single individual listed in the participant list, 
but are rather the summary views and conclusions drawn from the collective discussion. 
Where specific evidence or research contributions are mentioned, we have included 
references to the authors after seeking their permission. We take full responsibility for  
the conclusions as well as any errors contained in the report.
Sara Hagemann 
Sara Hobolt 
Julian Hoerner
London, 25 April 2016
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1. Introduction
One of the main criticisms of the European Union, both in the UK and in the rest of 
Europe, is that decisions taken in the Union lack democratic legitimacy. EU policy-making 
is often said to concentrate power in the hands of national executives and bureaucrats in 
Brussels, thus reducing the powers of national parliaments and national electorates.  
This is referred to as the “democratic deficit”. This Expert Hearing brought together 
leading scholars, pollsters, diplomats and politicians to discuss two crucial developments 
in UK-EU relations that in different ways address this democratic deficit. The first is the 
upcoming referendum on British membership of the European Union, which gives voters 
a say on the future of Britain in the EU for the first time since 1975. The second is the 
proposed reform, spearheaded by the British government, that aims to strengthen the role 
of national parliaments in EU decision-making. Do these initiatives constitute a ‘democratic 
moment’ that is likely to render the EU more democratically legitimate in the eyes of 
British voters?  What will a referendum outcome of ‘Remain’ or ‘Brexit’ mean in terms of 
the mandate voters give to the UK government? And, do national parliaments hold the 
key to greater legitimacy in EU politics? These questions were addressed in two inter-
related sessions of the Expert Hearing, starting with the discussion of the referendums on 
European integration and public attitudes towards the EU.
2.  Summary
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The conclusions of the hearing’s discussions 
were that:
•  Past referendum experiences in the UK 
and abroad show EU referendums are 
highly unpredictable and campaigns 
are decisive. Of key importance is the 
framing of the referendum question, 
potential status quo bias and the 
popularity of the government of the day.
•  Vote intentions have so far remained 
very stable in the Brexit debate, with 
the Leave and Remain sides neck and 
neck. Yet, the campaign may still 
shift attitudes and turnout could be 
important, with Brexiteers more likely 
to turn out on the day.
•  Public attitudes towards membership 
are shaped by perceptions of economic 
consequences of Brexit (which  
favour Remain) vs. sovereignty and 
identity questions (which favour Leave). 
Young and well-educated voters tend  
to be more pro-EU, whereas older 
and less-skilled workers are found to 
be more Eurosceptic. Ultimately, risk 
aversion may sway a majority to  
support Remain.
•  As part of the ongoing debate on 
democracy and sovereignty, the 
government has secured agreement 
for an enhanced role for national 
parliaments in EU affairs. The agreement 
will have little impact in policy-making, 
but sends an important political signal. 
It has already been followed up by 
proposals from House of Commons and 
House of Lords designed to increase 
their standing in UK-EU affairs.
•  National parliaments fulfil an important 
role as the arena for questioning, 
explaining and justifying EU policies. 
Yet, they differ greatly in their  
formal scrutiny powers and practices. 
The appropriate degree of influence  
by parliaments and their committees  
is a matter of political conviction, but 
one recommendation is to treat EU 
affairs as part of ‘domestic policy’  
rather than a branch of ‘foreign affairs’. 
•  The mandate that follows from the 
referendum – whether ‘Brexit’ or 
‘Remain’ – is unclear. If the outcome 
is to remain, it is likely that the UK 
parliament, and national parliaments 
elsewhere, will seek ways to engage 
more actively with EU affairs. If the 
outcome is ‘Brexit’, the UK Parliament 
will be presented with an entirely new 
set of challenges as the government 
seeks to secure new arrangements with 
the remaining EU member states. 
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3.a. Lessons from other  
EU referendums
When Britain goes to the polls on 23 June 
2016 to vote on whether to stay in or leave 
the European Union, it will be following 
in the footsteps of many other European 
countries. Since the early 1970s, over 
50 referendums have been held across 
Europe on various aspects of European 
integration. The experts at the Hearing 
discussed which lessons can be learned 
from other EU referendums, including the 
1975 referendum on British membership  
of the European Economic Community. 
There was a broad consensus that 
referendums on the EU are generally highly 
unpredictable and that the campaigns are 
often decisive to the outcome. 
A key lesson is therefore that governments 
should never be complacent about the 
outcome of a referendum on the EU.  
Since 2000, there have been 23 EU 
referendums and in eight of these a 
majority of voters rejected a proposal that 
had the broad backing of the mainstream 
political parties, the media, trade unions 
and business organisations. Such ‘No’ 
votes even occurred in countries that are 
traditionally very pro-European, including 
Ireland and France. Between them, these 
referendum experiences have revealed 
four key characteristics of ballots on 
the EU: The campaign matters, party 
messages are important, the framing of 
the “reversion point” and status quo bias 
matter, and, finally, EU referendums are 
not just about the EU. 
First, the campaign matters. The polls 
during the early stages of a referendum 
campaign often give a very poor indication 
of the actual outcome of the vote. 
Attitudes towards the EU are far more 
malleable than vote intentions in general 
elections. Many voters will change their 
minds as the referendum campaign 
progresses. And many remain undecided 
until they cast their vote. 
Second, parties are crucial in structuring 
the debate and the choices that voters 
face. During referendum campaigns, 
voters tend to turn to the political parties 
to which they feel closest for guidance 
on which way to vote. Yet when parties 
are openly split on the question party 
messages have a much weaker effect.  
In the UK both the Conservative Party  
and, to a lesser degree, the Labour 
Party have displayed internal division 
likely to weaken the impact of their 
recommendations to voters. 
Thirdly, the framing of the question 
matters hugely, in particular when it comes 
to the consequences of voting for Brexit 
or Remain. Voters face uncertainty not 
only about what Britain’s future within 
the European Union will look like, but 
also crucially what will happen if they vote 
to leave the EU. The “reversion point”, 
or the consequences of rejecting the 
proposal, has been shown to be a critical 
determinant of how people vote in EU 
referendums. Voters are generally risk 
averse, and hence when the “reversion 
point” is presented as a radical break with 
the status quo, or is associated with great 
uncertainty, this favours the ‘Remain’ side. 
3. The Brexit Referendum
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Research on previous referendums and 
polls has also shown that there is generally 
a small shift towards the status quo (the 
Remain side in this case) in the final weeks 
of the campaign, whereas earlier polls 
tend to overestimate voters’ desire for 
change. This does not suggest, however, 
that the outcome of this referendum is 
likely to resemble the 1975 vote, where 
67% of voters endorsed remaining in the 
EEC. The 1975 referendum was held in a 
fundamentally different context, not least 
given the fact that the UK at the time was 
economically weak and the EEC was seen 
as a “lifeboat” that might help the sinking 
ship. Today the British economy is seen as 
far more stable, whereas the EU has been 
marred by multiple crises.
Finally, it would be a mistake to think that 
voters care only, or even primarily, about 
the EU when they cast their vote in EU 
referendums. Referendums are potentially 
an opportunity for voters to express 
their dissatisfaction with the political 
establishment, and with the government 
in particular. This is why referendums held 
during the midterm of the electoral cycle, 
when governments are often relatively 
unpopular, are more likely to end in 
defeat. Such protest voting is especially 
common when the campaign is less intense 
and citizens feel less is at stake. 
3.b. Public opinion and the  
Brexit campaign 
Looking at the development in vote 
intentions ahead of the upcoming 
referendum on UK membership of the 
EU, it is tempting to conclude that the 
campaign makes no real difference. 
The “EU Referendum Poll of Polls”, 
compiled by Professor John Curtice, shows 
remarkably little movement in aggregate 
public opinion between October 2015 and 
April 2016. At the time of the Hearing,  
the race was too close to call, with 
the Remain side slightly in the lead in 
telephone polls and the Leave side ahead 
in most online polls. 
As in other EU referendums, the campaign 
is thus likely to be decisive in two ways: 
first, in terms of persuading voters what 
the referendum is about and second, 
in each side’s ability to mobilise their 
supporters to turn out.
When it comes to “framing” the question, 
the central challenge for Remain and  
Leave sides is to shape the issues that  
will matter when people cast their vote. 
The Remain side emphasises the disruption 
that Brexit would cause to the British 
economy (“a leap in the dark”). The Leave 
side, in contrast, highlights the threat to 
national identity and sovereignty posed 
by the EU and immigration (“take back 
control”). Research evidence shows that 
Referendums are potentially 
an opportunity for voters to 
express their dissatisfaction 
with the political establishment, 
and with the government  
in particular.
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the so-called “losers” of globalisation, 
those with lower levels of education 
and working class occupation, are more 
likely to be opposed to the EU, whereas 
the “winners” of globalisation – e.g. 
highly educated professionals – are much 
more favourably disposed. For those 
who say they will vote to stay in the EU, 
the argument that we will be worse off 
economically if we leave the EU generally 
carries greater weight than for those who 
intend to vote to leave. Yet the losers 
of globalisation face a dilemma: on the 
one hand they are generally more critical 
of the EU and more concerned about 
immigration, but on the other hand they 
have the most to lose financially if a Brexit 
vote causes economic disruption, given 
their frequently more vulnerable position 
in the labour market. A focus on economic, 
rather than cultural or political arguments, 
is thus likely to boost the Remain side.
Referendum campaigns work not only by 
persuading voters which issues are the most 
important, but also by mobilising people to 
vote. Evidence from Irish EU referendums 
has shown that voters are very similar to 
non-voters when it comes to vote intention; 
in other words, turnout should not make  
a great deal of difference. Yet this could  
be different in the Brexit referendum. 
Survey evidence from YouGov and other 
polling organisations has shown that 
individuals who oppose membership  
are more likely to vote than those  
who want Britain to remain in the EU. 
Moreover, older Britons are significantly 
more Eurosceptic than younger voters,  
and we know from general elections that 
age matters to turnout, since the young are 
much less likely to turn out. The experience 
of past referendums suggests that limited 
campaigning by the main opposition 
party often contributes to a defeat for the 
government. The efforts (or lack thereof) 
of the Labour Party in mobilising its 
supporters in the British referendum could 
thus be decisive. A lacklustre campaign 
with low turnout is thus likely to benefit 
the Leave camp, whereas a high-intensity 
campaign leading to high turnout will 
more likely boost the Remain side.
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3.c The public mandate in the event 
of a Brexit or Bremain vote
What democratic mandate will voters 
ultimately provide to the UK Government 
in the event of a Brexit or a Remain vote? 
The consensus among the experts that took 
part in this Hearing was that a majority 
in favour of Leave, even a relatively small 
majority, would force the Government 
to start British exit negotiations. Failure 
of the government to do so would 
undoubtedly cause a public uproar, not 
least since the Prime Minister has made it 
clear that a Leave vote really means Brexit. 
Leave campaigners, including those within 
his own party, would make sure to hold 
him to that promise. The consequence 
of a Leave-vote would therefore be that 
the UK government would invoke Article 
50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which sets out a 
procedure when an EU member declares 
its intention to leave. Negotiations would 
then take place between the UK and the 
rest of the EU to determine the terms 
of departure. These would need to be 
completed within two years (at which 
point the UK’s EU membership would 
automatically cease). However, while a 
Leave vote would most likely mean that 
the UK would start negotiating its exit 
from the EU, it is far less clear that a vote 
provides the Government with a specific 
mandate for the actual terms of departure. 
There is no consensus in the Leave camp 
about Britain’s relationship with the EU 
post-Brexit (e.g. in terms of links with 
the Single European Market), and voters 
equally have diverse views on this issue. 
Hence, the content of these negotiations 
are likely to be informed more by the UK 
negotiating team, and the deal proposed 
by the remaining EU members, than the 
referendum itself.
In the event of a Remain majority in the 
referendum, our experts also agreed that 
it was highly unlikely that this would 
“settle” the European question in Britain 
for decades to come and thus provide 
much-needed democratic legitimacy to 
Britain’s membership of the EU. The forces 
in British politics that wish to see the 
end of British membership are not likely 
to disappear simply owing to a Remain 
vote. In fact, such forces may even have 
been emboldened by the referendum 
campaign, as was evident in the case of 
the Scottish referendum. The issue of 
Scottish independence is still very much 
on the table, despite the vote against 
independence in 2014 - by a margin of 
55-45. Hence, the debate on Britain’s 
place within the EU is likely to continue 
regardless, and there may even be calls for 
a further referendum on EU membership in 
the foreseeable future. This will in part be 
influenced by the size of any majority for 
the Remain side. It looks unlikely, however, 
that the Remain-side can replicate the 
resounding victory of the yes-camp in the 
1975 referendum.
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The second part of the discussion in 
this Hearing evaluated the potential of 
national parliaments to make the EU 
more democratic. The UK government 
presented its decision to hold an EU 
membership referendum as a reaction 
to growing Euroscepticism in the British 
public. Much of this Euroscepticism stems 
from discontent with the level of influence 
people feel they have on the direction 
of the EU agenda and the content of its 
policies. To this effect, a further increase in 
the standing of national parliaments in the 
EU is an important element of the ‘New 
Settlement for the UK in the European 
Union’, which the EU government agreed 
in February 2016. 
4.a National parliaments as the 
answer to greater legitimacy in  
EU politics? 
The idea of giving national parliaments a 
more important role in EU policy-making is 
not new. National parliaments’ support is, 
after all, the key to democratic legitimacy 
of governments’ actions at home and 
abroad. But many governments have seen 
the involvement of parliaments as an 
unmanageable and unwelcome constraint 
when negotiating compromises in Brussels. 
Thus, as calls for greater democratic 
accountability and responsiveness in 
EU politics continued to grow over the 
years, the response from EU institutions 
and national governments was instead 
to grant greater powers to the European 
Parliament, with only marginal changes to 
the role of national parliaments. Instead 
the Commission Hearing concluded 
national parliaments in a number of 
member states were side-lined when it 
came to EU affairs.
Yet, the desire in recent years to bring 
back powers to national capitals has 
meant growing pressure on governments 
to grant national parliaments more 
powers as a means of enhancing the 
accountability and legitimacy of EU politics. 
The German Bundestag, a prime example, 
has been particularly active. Thus, the UK’s 
agreement on national parliaments may 
be merely the start of a process whereby 
national parliaments assert themselves 
more formally and more frequently vis-à-vis 
their governments. As pressure mounts to 
find solutions to Europe’s refugee situation 
and Eurozone governance problems, 
this could rapidly become the norm. 
Governments thus have a collective interest 
in showing their parliamentarians that 
parliamentary concerns and priorities are 
taken into account.
There is, however, considerable national 
variation in the scrutiny powers of 
parliaments and their practical application 
throughout the EU. A frequently discussed 
model of successful parliamentary scrutiny 
arrangements is the Danish Folketing, 
which follows a mandating system. 
The Danish government has to gain a 
priori approval of the European Affairs 
Committee before being able to agree on 
an issue in the EU. Importantly, in contrast 
to the UK system and many other countries’ 
scrutiny procedures, the Danish model 
considers EU affairs part of domestic affairs 
rather than as a branch of foreign policy. 
The application of an ex ante scrutiny 
4.  The Role of National Parliaments in the EU 
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system integrated into the domestic realm 
of politics has reportedly had a positive 
impact on the implementation of EU legal 
acts in the Danish case. 
But the jury is still out when it comes 
to the kind of powers that national 
parliaments generally should enjoy, and 
on whether the Danish model is one to 
follow for all member states. Whether 
parliaments should have consultative 
powers, information rights, amendment 
rights or a direct say on government 
positions in EU affairs is a matter of 
political conviction. It is also, to some 
extent, dependent on the parliamentary 
system in place (whether multi-party; 
occurrence of single-, coalition- or minority 
governments, etc.). Nevertheless, a 
relevant lesson for the UK could be the 
‘mainstreaming’ of EU policies from the 
European Affairs Committees towards 
sectoral committees with additional 
technical expertise.   
Recent evidence from comparative 
research was also presented at the 
Hearing, showing how national 
parliaments are key to communicating 
European Union affairs to citizens by 
serving as arenas in which policies can be 
criticised, defended and justified. Indeed, 
national parliaments seem to fulfil this 
role rather well, with 20-30% debates 
being held on European issues. Perhaps 
surprisingly, in the UK 30% of Parliament’s 
plenary debates between 2008 and 2012 
entailed a strong EU dimension – far more 
than in Germany and slightly more than 
in Austria. These debates tend to centre 
around the issue areas of budgetary and 
financial affairs, followed by justice and 
home affairs, and are often initiated by  
the opposition. 
It remains questionable, however, whether 
the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of 
the voters is really anchored in the role 
of national parliaments in policy-making, 
or whether – perhaps more likely– other 
factors are more decisive. Indeed, not 
all groups in society find their priorities 
better represented through their national 
parliament than through other channels 
of representation at the EU level, such 
as the European Parliament and their 
national government. Also, while the EU 
is slightly more heterogeneous in terms 
of the distribution of preferences among 
its population than the average member 
state, the risk of producing permanent 
minorities is lower. Interestingly, for the 
UK the distribution of citizens’ economic 
preference on a left-right scale is more 
similar to the European average than for 
any other member state. 
One may also ask how important national 
parliaments’ scrutiny of governments 
in EU affairs really is, and whether it 
has any real impact on policies and 
governmental behaviour. Evidence shows 
that governments controlled by ‘strong’ 
parliaments are more likely to vote  
against policy proposals in the Council 
and to voice their disagreement when 
negotiating and adopting policies.  
The domestic strength of parliaments in 
EU affairs thus seems to have an impact 
on the behaviour of governments – a 
significant finding regarding the potential 
of national parliaments to link domestic 
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and European debates and policy-making. 
Of course, some question whether this 
is always desirable. Our experts voiced 
considerable disagreement regarding 
national parliaments’ role in addressing the 
democratic deficit of the European Union. 
4.b. The ‘New Settlement’ for 
the UK and the role of national 
parliaments 
A key point in David Cameron’s agreement 
with his EU partners for an enhanced role 
for the national parliaments is the proposal 
for a so-called ‘red card’ system. The 
system effectively forces the Commission 
to withdraw a legislative proposal if 55% 
of national parliaments agree that the 
proposed legislation violates the principal 
of subsidiarity. However, the consensus 
view is that the practical application of 
this new measure is likely to be rather 
small. Research suggests that the red card 
procedure would have made a difference 
only in 9 out of 703 votes in the Council of 
Ministers since July 2009, the equivalent 
of 1.3% of cases. Moreover, the related 
‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ procedures 
already introduced in Protocol 2 of the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009 - but less binding - 
have been used very rarely (twice in the 
case of the yellow card and not even once 
in the case of the orange card), despite 
having a lower threshold (one-third  
and half of parliaments respectively).  
The impact of the ‘New Settlement’ on 
the role of national parliaments in the EU 
is thus likely to be very limited. The only 
outcome of some significance in this respect 
is the extended time period in which 
national parliaments may submit reasoned 
opinions for the red card procedure (twelve 
instead of eight weeks for the yellow and 
orange card procedures). 
4.c Challenges and opportunities 
for Parliaments in the event of 
Brexit and Remain
Despite the lack of substantial increase 
in the powers of national parliaments 
entailed in the compromise agreement, 
there is general agreement that the 
deal sends an important political signal. 
National parliaments are likely to enhance 
their political standing in EU affairs in 
their respective domestic contexts; ample 
evidence exists to suggest such a trend. 
Nevertheless, the consequence for national 
parliaments of either a vote for ‘Brexit’ 
or a vote to ‘Remain’ are not at all clear 
at this point, and developments are likely 
to unfold over an extended period. Both 
outcomes only indicate the beginning 
of a rather long and uncertain process 
of change for Parliament, and the exact 
mandate for the government in both cases 
is far from clear. 
Consensus emerged at the Expert Hearing 
that in case of ‘Brexit’, the British Parliament 
would still have to concern itself with the 
democratic control of whatever relationship 
the UK will negotiate with the rest of the 
EU. Similarly, relations and regular contacts 
with other national parliaments in Europe 
and the European Parliament would 
continue to exist. Importantly, the lengthy 
negotiation process would be accompanied 
by drawn-out attempts to disentangle 
European and British law. European affairs 
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would thus remain high on the agenda of 
both UK Houses of Parliament for a long 
time to come. 
However, it was also argued that ‘Brexit’ 
might arguably even have a detrimental 
impact on democratic legitimacy and 
parliamentary sovereignty in the UK 
context. Free trade agreements as secured 
by the European Economic Area (EEA) 
countries and Switzerland are often highly 
technical in nature. Their negotiation, 
implementation and oversight would thus 
most likely be managed by civil servants 
with relevant expertise and ‘behind closed 
doors’. Indeed, Parliament might find itself 
further isolated from matters relating 
to Britain’s relationship with the rest of 
Europe than is currently the case. At the 
same time, the ongoing debate about 
devolution of powers to the regions, and 
likely pressure for a second referendum on 
Scottish independence, would also raise 
questions of Parliament’s standing and 
powers. Several of our experts suggested 
it was hence an irony to call the ‘Brexit’ 
option a ‘repatriation of powers’ or 
‘enhancement of sovereignty’ if Parliament 
ends up side-lined from both top (in 
renegotiations with EU partners) and 
below (in devolution to the regions). 
By contrast, a vote to ‘Remain’ might 
lead to a Status Quo Plus – albeit more 
due to the existing opt-outs rather than 
the new ‘red card’ provisions. In terms 
of parliamentary deliberation, ‘systemic’ 
debates on the merits of EU membership 
might cease and leave more room for policy 
oriented debates. Yet, some participants at 
the Hearing doubted that a vote to Remain 
would result in an end to fundamental 
political contestation on Britain’s 
relationship with the rest of Europe in the 
plenaries of the Houses of Parliament. 
Many remained sceptical of the potential 
of national parliaments – collectively, 
as institutions – to foster democratic 
legitimacy in the EU, terming this a ‘fantasy 
belief’. Political opportunity structures, not 
least in the UK, are simply not conducive to 
such a role, some would argue. Moreover, 
different notions of ‘sovereignty’ are 
reflected in the debates across countries. 
Whereas in some member states, and 
particularly in the UK, EU membership 
may be seen as a threat to parliamentary 
sovereignty, in other countries, such 
as Denmark, EU membership may be 
considered sovereignty-enhancing. 
Overall, the LSE Commission Hearing 
emphasised that the role and potential of 
further national parliamentary enhancement 
is highly dependent on domestic political 
context. Nonetheless, the UK referendum 
has brought the role of national parliaments 
in EU affairs to the centre of political 
attention. This is likely to remain for some 
time to come, regardless of the outcome of 
the referendum on June 23rd.
the role and potential of 
further national parliamentary 
enhancement is highly 
dependent on domestic 
political context
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The conclusion of the Hearing was that 
the UK’s referendum does not provide a 
clear mandate for the UK government 
to pursue a defined path for the UK 
in Europe, regardless of whether the 
outcome is to stay in or leave the European 
Union. Uncertainty surrounds the political 
agenda of the EU itself, as the refugee 
crisis and Eurozone situation look set 
to reshape EU politics altogether in the 
foreseeable future. For the UK, much will 
therefore depend on the interpretation 
the government makes in reaction to the 
referendum result when it presents its case 
after the referendum. Three scenarios are 
relevant in this respect: 
The first scenario is one where voters 
support the UK’s continued membership 
of the EU with a large majority and with a 
high turnout. Here, the result will likely be 
presented as a victory for the government, 
suggesting strong support for its pursuit  
of a ‘special status’ for the UK in the EU 
and a general ‘vote of confidence’.  
As pressure eases in this context, 
government will find itself with a large 
room for manoeuvre on the degree to 
which it wishes to emphasise its special 
status as an EU member, or whether it  
will seek to engage as a leader in the  
EU and Europe. Momentum can also  
be expected centrally for Parliament.  
It is likely to seek ways to enhance its 
domestic role in European affairs.  
The House of Commons European Affairs 
Scrutiny Committee and the House of 
Lords EU Select Committee have already 
proposed changes to that effect. But the 
government will have a freer hand both 
when answering Parliament and when 
negotiating in Brussels. 
A second scenario is where the result is a 
narrow margin of support for ‘remain’. 
Again, the government can present this as 
a win. It may be argued to reflect a pro-, 
yet critical, take on EU membership.  
The accuracy of this interpretation may  
be questioned of course, since the results 
are not based on a spectrum of opinion 
about EU membership, but rather on 
a binary In/Out question. Pressure will 
nevertheless remain on the government 
to assert the UK’s interests and its ‘special 
status’ in the EU in this scenario, and, as 
discussed above, Parliament is likely to 
assert itself through interpretation of  
the articles on the enhanced role of 
national parliaments including in ‘the  
New Settlement for the UK in the EU’.
The third scenario is the rejection of EU 
membership by UK voters. As discussed 
above, consensus among the experts was 
that a Brexit vote, even with low turnout, 
would trigger the UK’s exit from the EU. 
But beyond the mandate to exit the EU, 
the referendum would only provide limited 
guidance as to the sort of settlement to 
negotiate with Europe. Moreover, the UK 
Parliament would likely have a limited role 
in these renegotiations. As mentioned, the 
negotiation process would be accompanied 
by a lengthy and highly technical process 
to disentangle elements of European and 
British law and secure new agreements. 
The negotiation, implementation and 
oversight would thus most likely be 
carried out by civil servants with relevant 
expertise and ‘behind closed doors’. In this 
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way, Parliament could find itself further 
isolated from matters relating to Britain’s 
relationship with the rest of Europe than 
is currently the case. That said, many have 
argued that a repatriation of powers may 
result in a more autonomous Parliament 
in the longer run, where decisions to enter 
into cooperation with EU partners may be 
taken on a case-by-case basis, and with 
consideration of the depth and scope of 
individual policy collaborations. 
In sum, the referendum on 23 June will 
not specify a mandate for the government 
to pursue one particular political path for 
the UK in the changing European political 
landscape. Much uncertainty surrounds 
future scenarios and only one thing is 
clear: whether UK voters decide for Brexit  
or Remain, EU politics will continue to 
affect the British public’s day-to-day lives 
and is likely to dominate the agenda for 
the UK parliament for quite some time.
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